…The Italian ally was, in all, standing in our way everywhere. Because of it, we could not pursue a completely new policy in North Africa. Under the circumstances, it was obvious that Italy claimed this space, and The Duce always made that claim. By ourselves, we would have had the opportunity to liberate the peoples ruled by France…
Translated into English from:
ADOLF HITLER – EIN LEBEN FUER DEUTSCHLAND UND EUROPA
BY THIES CHRISTOPHERSEN
[* Comments by admin]
We did not fulfill our task, and we did not make good use of our advantage when, after 1940, we did not liberate the French working class, just as we failed to help the peoples under French protectorate gain independence overseas. The French people surely would not have held it against us if we had disposed of this burden for them of the colonial empire.
In this area, the people have displayed more common sense than the layers of leadership allegedly called into power. The French people, more than its leadership clique, have the innate sense for what is of true value to their nation. Under Louis XV., as well as under Jules Ferry, they rebelled against the nonsense of colonial adventures. I do not know of Napoleon having become unpopular because he exchanged Louisiana for money. Conversely, his incompetent nephew has lost his prestige with the Mexican adventure.”
“When soberly assessing the events, once I ignore my feelings, I have to admit that my indissoluble friendship with The Duce and loyalty to Italy could be judged as a mistake. The Alliance with Italy has obviously helped our enemies more than it benefited us. Italy’s entry into the war has brought us very few advantages, compared to the countless difficulties that are connected to it. If we do not win this war despite everything, Italy will have its measured share of our defeat.
The best service that Italy could have bestowed upon us would have been to stay out of the war. This noninterference would have earned our every conceivable recognition and would have bestowed the most valuable gifts. As long as Italy was satisfied with the modest spectator role, we could shower it with favorable corroboration. In the case of victory, we were ready to share fame and profit with this Axis partner. We would have gladly helped proclaim around the world the historical myth of the primacy of Italians in the Mediterranean as the legitimate descendants of ancient Romans. All this was still better than having them as an ally!
Italy’s entry into the war in June of 1940, in order to boot the French army already in its full disintegration, could only tarnish the glory of our victory, unreservedly admitted by the defeated. France acknowledged the defeat inflicted on it by the Wehrmacht, but it did not want to be defeated by the Axis Powers.
The Italian ally was, all in all, standing in our way everywhere. Because of it, we could not pursue a completely new policy in North Africa. Under the circumstances, it was obvious that Italy claimed this space, and The Duce always made that claim. By ourselves, we would have had the opportunity to liberate the peoples ruled by France.
Such an uprising had to have had unforeseeable consequences in Egypt and the English-occupied Middle East. By linking our fate with that of the Italians, such a policy was unthinkable. All of Islam trembled in anticipation of our victories. The peoples of Egypt, Iraq and all of the Middle East were ready for insurrection. What all we could have done to help them, to strengthen their courage, as our advantage and our duty demanded!
The fact that we were allied with the Italians paralyzed us, and moreover caused our Muhammadan friends discomfort, because we were, either intentionally or unintentionally, the accomplices of their oppressors. The Italians are even more hateful in those territories than the French and the English. The memory of the atrocities against the Senussi is still vivid.
In addition, the ridiculous presumptuousness of The Duce to be celebrated as the so-called Sword of Islam, elicited already before the war a mocking grin. Mussolini had been given this title, appropriate for the Prophet Mohamed and a conqueror the likes of Omar, by some poor devils whom he had paid or has extorted. For us Germans, a generous pro-Islamic policy was so simple and obvious. It’s been messed up for us, as much else has been messed up by loyalty to our coalition!
Only the Italians obstructed us from playing one of our best cards in this war theater: declaring independence for all peoples under French protectorate and to bring about a general uprising in the areas oppressed by the British. Such a policy would have been received enthusiastically throughout Islam.
It is indeed a peculiarity of the Mohammedan world that good and bad experiences of an individual tribe are sympathized with and judged by exactly the same intensity by all of their peoples, from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
From a moral point of view, the impact of our politics was doubly disastrous. On the one hand, we insulted the pride of the French without gaining any advantage. On the other hand, we were forced to leave untouched the rule of the colonies, hitherto exercised by them, solely because of the concern that Libya and the Cyrenaica (*formerly Italian colonial territories) could otherwise be set alight and demand their independence. The consequences are disastrous as at the present moment all of these areas are occupied by the Anglo-Americans.
Our nonsensical policies have even made it possible for the perfidious English to represent themselves as liberators in Syria, Cyrenaica and Tripoli! From a military point of view, the bottom line does not look any better! Italy’s entry into the war almost automatically led to the first victories of our opponents, with whose help Churchill could revive the courage of his compatriots and give new hope to the entire Anglophile world.
Despite their inability to remain even only in Abyssinia and Cyrenaica, the Italians had the nerve to plunge into the completely senseless Greek campaign without asking and without saying a word to us. Their miserable failure spurred the hate of certain Balkan people against us.
Here, and nowhere else, lie the causes of increasing difficulties with Belgrade and the eventual dropping away of the Yugoslavs in the spring of 1941. Against our will, we were, therefore, required to intervene militarily in the events of the Balkans, a situation that forced the ominous delay of the march against Russia. Further, the strength of our best divisions was unnecessarily worn down. In the end, we were in a bind to occupy vast, confusing land that otherwise would have made the presence of our troops unnecessary.
The Balkans would have been only too happy to confine themselves to a benevolent neutrality towards the Reich. As for our Stuka and paratroopers, I definitely would rather have used them over Malta and Gibraltar than over Corinth and Crete.
If only the Italians would have left their paws out of this war! If only they had stayed with “non-warfare!” What tremendous value such a comportment would have had for us, based on our mutual friendship and common interests! Even the Allies were interested in that. For, though they did not have too much respect for Italy’s military power, they hardly considered such a failure of the Italians possible. Therefore, they must have had deemed a neutral Italy a special stroke of luck.
But since there was no guarantee for the enemies that Italy’s neutrality would last, they would have had to bind up important troops in its vicinity, if threatened by Italy’s possible, or even probable, entry into the war.
For us, again, this meant a certain number of British combat units, not experienced in battle and victory, tied up in the Mediterranean – a potato war [*war with a restricted aim-Clausewitz] – this time for our sole benefit.
A long-lasting war will serve the adversary in that it fosters its military training and military experience. I had hoped to conduct this whole war so that the enemy would never have time to look into the art of modern Blitzkrieg. We achieved that in Poland, Norway, Holland, Belgium and France. The quick victories, causing the least losses on both sides, were, nonetheless, also resounding military and political successes as they put the enemy completely out of action.
Had this war remained a war led by only Germany and not by the Axis, we would have attacked Russia as early as May 15, 1941. Strengthened in the awareness and reputation of total and also undisputed victories and campaigns, we were able to finish the Eastern campaign before the onset of winter. Everything would have been different! Out of gratitude – for I have never forgotten The Duce’s attitude regarding the return of Austria – I have always restrained myself from criticism and judgment of Italy.
On the contrary, I have made the effort to treat equal for equal. The laws of life prove that it is a mistake to treat those as our equals who are in reality not. The Duce was my equal; he was even superior to me in his ambitions for his people. But it does not depend on ambitions but on actions.
We Germans must never forget that in difficult situations it is always better for us to stand alone. We have everything to lose, but nothing to gain when we bind ourselves to weaklings and choose allies who have already given us earlier samples of their fickleness. I have often said that victory will be on the spot where Italy stands. I should have better said that ‘There where victory is, Italy will also be.’
My personal connection with The Duce has not changed and also not my sympathy for the Italian people. But I regret to have suppressed the voice of reason that suggested to me a more sober criticism, even with all my friendship with Italy. That would have also befitted its people. I know, however, that he would not have forgiven me for such a stance; I know that I could seriously injure him by mistrust and doubt.
But serious consequences resulted from my consideration that could have been avoided because they were not inevitable. Life does not forgive any weakness.”
* * * *
“The entry of Japan into the war had no negative consequences for us, even as the Japanese delivered Roosevelt the longed-for pretext to mobilize the American forces also against us. But Roosevelt [*Jew], driven by the Jews, was determined anyway to make war and destroy National Socialism, and no one needed to give him a reason to do so. He was quite capable of fabricating the pretexts he needed to overcome the healthy isolationism of the American people. One deception more or less didn’t make any difference to him.
Still, the magnitude and impact of the devastation inflicted on Pearl Harbor was a great bait for him. It was exactly what he needed to drive his compatriots into the war and eliminate the last resistance in his country. What he all did to provoke the Japanese!
The whole of it was only a reprise of that intrigue that Wilson had used to succeed so exceptionally in the First World War, the cynically provoked torpedoing of the “Lusitania” as a psychological preparation of the Americans for the declaration of war on the Central Powers, but now tailored to a global scale.
If the intervention of the Americans as early as 1917 could not be prevented, then it is obvious that 25 years later this intervention in the events forcibly has an inescapable cause. The war with America was inevitable.
Certainly it is regrettable that the Japanese did not immediately intervene with us in the war against Soviet Russia. In that case Stalin’s armies would not be in front of Breslau at the moment, and the Soviets would not be in Budapest. Together we would have exterminated Bolshevism before the winter of 1941, and Roosevelt would have not dared to provoke such an enemy.
On the other hand, one could also regret that the Japanese did not occupy Singapore as early as 1940, in other words, immediately after the defeat of France. The United States, in the midst of its presidential election, would have been unable to do anything. There never was a turning point in this war either.
Be it as it may, our fate will stay connected with that of the Japanese. We will win together or we will go down together. If fate destroys us first, then I can hardly imagine that the Russians will maintain the myth of “Asian solidarity” regarding Japan for much longer.
The English have had even worse experiences with their Latin allies. Certainly, Chamberlain would not have thrown himself into war without hesitation if he had been fully aware of France’s rottenness. According to the plan of the English, France should have been the one with all the victims of the land war. Nothing would have been easier for Chamberlain than – after a few crocodile tears about the misfortune – to leave Poland up to its next division.
In Latin peoples, effective powerlessness pairs with ridiculous presumptuousness. Be it friendly Italy or hostile France, for us this weakness was equally fatal. The only disagreements between me and The Duce arose because at times I was forced to take certain precautions.
Of course, I personally trusted him fully, but I always had to keep him in the dark about my plans if these plans could be jeopardized by an indiscretion because the same trust that I granted Mussolini, he transferred to Ciano, and this peacock kept no secrets from women who ensnared him.
We paid dearly for this realization. But our opponents paid cash to find out something, and many a secret got to them in this way. So I had good reasons to not always pour pure wine for The Duce. It is a pity that he could not understand this, and it became catastrophic when he not only felt insulted by this but paid us back in the same way.
We really have no luck with Latins! While I went to Montoire to demonstrate a grotesque policy of working together and then to Hendaye to endure a Judas kiss, a third Latin, who was my real friend, used the opportunity of my absence to launch his unfortunate Greek campaign.
We needed nothing more urgently than peace to do our work. I have always sought peace. Our enemies’ resolve has forced this war on us. Their war instigation already dates back to January of 1933, the day when I took power.
There are two fronts facing each other, time and time again in the course of history. They are irreconcilable camps. On the one hand there is World Jewry and its accomplices and on the other the representatives of a national Real-Politic.
The one strives for well-being of abstract individualism and pursues illusions of a Universalist solution. The other is made up of people of action and is reality based. National Socialism, however, only recognizes its German expression for Germany, and nothing else in the world interests it.
The Universalists, internationalists and utopians aim for nothing. They promise an unattainable paradise and thereby cheat the world. In whatever way they disguise themselves, whether as Christians, Communists or Liberals, honest fools or cynical deceivers, they all work on the subjugation of the peoples. But I have always had in mind possibilities within our power and in a realm of reality for my people, and that means spiritual and material well-being of the German people.
I’ve always made promises only as much as I could keep and was determined to keep. This is one of the reasons for the profound hatred that I have received, precisely because I did not promise the impossible, like all my opponents. I spoiled their concept. I remained an outsider in the union of apostles for humanity and professional politicians, whose closely guarded secret is exploitation of human stupidity.”
* * * *
“I have repeatedly emphasized that National Socialist doctrine is not for export; it is designed only for the German people. Therefore, any National Socialist demand is for that reason, necessarily, directed toward limited and achievable goals. This is why I neither believe in indivisible peace nor in indivisible war.
In the days of Munich it became clear to me that the enemies of the Third Reich demanded our heads, at any price, and that there was no basis for negotiation with them. When the plutocratic bourgeois Chamberlain, with his peaceful and deceptive umbrella, then lowered himself to fly to the Berghof to confer with upstart Hitler, he already knew that England would at one point announce to us a fight to the knife. He was willing to promise me the world in order to put me asleep. His sudden Wanderlust was only aroused in his interest to gain time.
At that moment we should have struck immediately. Already in 1938 we should have struck. At that time it was the last opportunity to rope in the war. But they accepted everything. Like weaklings they yielded to all of my demands. Under such circumstances, it was indeed difficult to break out a war. We missed a unique opportunity in Munich to win the inevitable war easily and quickly.
Although we had then been anything but ready to go to battle, we were still better equipped than our opponents. September 1938 was the best moment when an attack would have meant the least risk for us. Plus it had the advantage of excluding a worldwide expansion of the war.”
* * * *
“The war with America is a tragic interconnection, as irrational as it is nonsensical.
An unfortunate historical coincidence has brought about the seizure of power to coincide with the moment when the candidate of world Jewry, Roosevelt, took to the wheel in the White House. Without the Jews and their representatives, history would have taken a different course. In and of itself, everything speaks in favor of the fact that Germany and the United States, even if they do not particularly love each other and build friendship bonds, at least get along with each other without too much effort.
After all, the Germans make up a not inconsiderable share of the population in America. German blood flowed in streams for its independence, and men like General Steuben played a crucial role in the American Revolutionary War. The global economic crisis hit Germany and the United States almost equally and simultaneously. We have also taken quite similar measures to overcome the crisis. Despite all the difficulties, our efforts were crowned with outstanding success.
Under much more favorable conditions over there, Roosevelt and his Jewish brain trust, had little success. The failure of the New Deal had a decisive share in the war psychosis. The United States have practically the preconditions for a strong economy that we also dream of. They have unlimited space on where to work out their energies unchecked. We, too, hope for Germany that we will one day be able to secure its economic independence in a living space suitable for its population.
Germany makes no demands on the United States, and they have not the slightest to fear from Germany. All prerequisites for a peaceful coexistence, each for themselves, exist. But everything is spoiled by international Jewry that has designated the United States as its mighty bulwark. This – and only this – disturbs everything.
The Americans will one day realize that they worshiped a false idol in Roosevelt, and that this Jewish offspring was in reality a criminal against the United States as well as against all humanity. He misleads them onto paths where they have no cause to be on and drives them to interfere in disputes that are none of their business.
A minimum of political instinct should have re-enforced in them adherence to their well-established isolationism and would have had them play only the role of impartial observer in this conflict. With some political maturity and a little more experience, they would have realized, no doubt, that their decisive advantage lay in the restriction to a watchful neutrality over the disagreements in Europe. By interfering, they’ve only driven themselves further into the knife of their Jewish exploiters.
A true head of state – if Providence should send the United States in this fateful hour another than this Roosevelt – a personality capable of adapting American life to the demands of the twentieth century, would have become the most important president after Lincoln. The crisis of the thirties was merely a growth crisis but of global proportions. Economic liberalism turned out to be an outmoded formula.
Once the cause and scope of this crisis has been grasped, all that remains to be done is to use the appropriate means of defense against it.
A true White House personality would have taken on this one task, and its solution would have helped him to a unique position on the political chessboard of the world. But for that he would have had to draw the attention of his compatriots to the great international problems and open their eyes to our planet instead of throwing them into the chaos of a world war, as this criminal, Roosevelt, did. Sheer madness!
With unprecedented cynicism he has misused the ignorance, folly and gullibility of the Americans. Roosevelt let his Yankees see the world through Jewish eyes and set them on a path that leads to a catastrophe if they do not catch themselves in time.
The affairs of the Americans are not ours, and it would leave me utterly cold, whatever happens to them, unless their attitude had an immediate effect on our fate and that of Europe. There is one more reason for us to get along with the Americans: neither they nor we tend to colonize.
The Germans have in reality never shown any inclination towards imperialism. I regard the bumbling attempts at the end of the 19th century as an infidelity in our history. The defeat of 1918 had at least one good thing, to stop us on a fateful road, to where the Germans – jealous of successes whose transience they were unaware of – had foolishly been led by the example of the French and the English. It is justifiable to credit the Third Reich for not crying a tear over this survived past. On the contrary, we bravely and resolutely turned toward the future, the establishment of homogeneous central states, and to Grand Continental Politics. And the natural American tradition points into the same direction: noninterference into the affairs of other continents and defense against foreign interference in the affairs of the New World.
Only because we always had to rush and act under duress, so many things have failed! Swift action in our case was synonymous with a plunge. But in order to let decisions mature with patience, one needs time and space – and we lack both.
The Russians have both in abundance and in addition have a tendency to passivity, the trait of the Slavic-Eastern mentality. They also have the means, through their Marxist doctrine, to restrain the people. For that they promise paradise on earth, but only in the distant future, and thus differ significantly from the Christian dogma. The Jew Mordecai Marx, a staunch Hebrew, was also waiting for his Messiah. Without delay, he transformed him into historical materialism and opposed the hope for the infinite with earthly bliss. This happiness, he claimed, is within reach. It is promised, but one must wait without forcing it.
That’s the right spin to snare suckers. What Lenin did not accomplish, Stalin will complete… and the same by the row of Communist dictators. That’s cunning. But what should one expect from a Christianity, also sprung from the Jewish brain, that can afford to promise its believers paradise only in the afterlife? This is incomparably more powerful!
I, on the other hand, are under the fateful command to complete everything within a single short human life. I am only supported by a sober world view, based on realities whose promises must take on tangible forms and forbid me to promise the sky.
Others have eternity, but I have only a few paltry years. They rely on their successors, who start in the same place where their predecessor left off – substitutes who extend the same furrow with the same plow. I ask myself incessantly, Where among my immediate collaborators can an Elected be found to carry on the torch that one day will slip from my hands?
I am the last chance for Europe! The new Europe is not forced by parliamentary vote, not by discussions and resolutions, but alone by might.
The new Europe can only grow out of ruins. I do not mean the stone heaps of a mad, material destruction but the mental ruins of self-interest, narrow-mindedness and chauvinist church tower politics.
Europe must be built for the benefit of all [*indigenous Europeans] and at the expense of all. Napoleon recognized this perfectly. Nobody more than I can grasp the agony of the great Corsican, who, obsessed with the conquest of peace, was constantly forced to lead new wars, always in the hope of still chasing down peace.
Since the summer of 1940, I have been experiencing the same anguish in my soul. Again and again it is this England, the same England that closes itself off to the rights for life on the mainland. True, in the meantime it has become old and brittle but, therefore, the more vicious and corrupt. And in its disintegrating and unnatural actions it has found the help of the United States, itself under the fetter of World Jewry. The Eternal Jew lives from our disunity and hopes to continue to suck honey from it.
When I reached the conviction that an agreement with England was impossible, I decided to seek a decision in the East by force of arms. Churchill did not appreciate the generosity and chivalry that I have proved to England hundreds of times by avoiding the utmost. Intentionally, I have spared the fleeing British at Dunkirk. If only one of them could have made it clear to them that the recognition of our leadership on the continent, something that they stubbornly resisted, could have brought them nothing but advantages.
Already toward the end of July, a month after defeating France, I realized that peace had once more escaped us. A few weeks later I knew that the invasion of the English Island before the autumn storms could no longer succeed, as we could not secure air rule. I also realized that the invasion of England would never succeed and have eliminated it from my plans.
The conduct of the Soviets in the summer of 1940, occupying the Baltic region and Bessarabia, while we had our hands full, left not the least doubt as to their true goals. And if they should still have existed, Molotov’s visit in November would have completely dispelled them. Nor could Stalin’s proposals after the return of his Foreign Minister deceive me. Stalin, this born extortionist, just wanted to gain time and improve his starting position in Finland and the Balkans. It was nothing but a cat and mouse game!
It’s a pity that we could not attack before May 15, but in order to overrun Russia in the first onrush, we could not wait any longer. Stalin, on the other hand, was in a position to start the war at any day.
During the whole winter, and especially in the first days of spring in 1941, the thought that the Soviets might attack robbed me of sleep, as the Italian failure in Albania and Cyrenaica in the Balkans created a whole new situation and sparked a mutiny. The reputation of the invincibility of our weapons seemed clouded by friend and foe. Finally, there was no other reason for the defection of Yugoslavia that forced us to involve the Balkans in the war. This was a situation that I wanted to avoid at all cost.
Once the war had taken this direction, it was a given to march on. Only a fraction of the units provided for the offense against Russia would have been enough to liberate the Near Orient (Vorderen Orient). But should we engage that far from our power centers and with that virtually invite the Soviets to attack us? They would invariably have done so during the summer, but by latest in the fall and then under such unfavorable conditions for us that any hope for our victory would have been naive.
The Soviets display the patience of a pachyderm only towards the Judea-Democrats. For they know that those will automatically fall victim to them without any external impetus, simply because of their internal political weaknesses, triggered by the constant economic crises as a result of the dissatisfaction of the masses, who are succumbing to the Marxist poison. But they also know that they can never speculate on that in a National Socialist Reich. They know that we are sky high superior to them, in peace even more so than in war.
The Russian lethargy also results from the fact that the materialistic conception of history allows them to avoid possible risks and wait until their plans are ripe – a year, a human lifespan, and if necessary even a whole century. Time costs nothing. Marxism promises those without property paradise on earth, but not today, not even tomorrow, but in an uncertain future.
For a whole year we sunned ourselves in the hope that at least a reasonable, if not overly friendly, cooperation with Stalin would be possible. I fancied, 15 years of power and responsibility would have had to liberate a realist – and Stalin is undoubtedly a realist – from the birthing woes of nebulous Marxist ideology that is kept further in reserve only as opium for foreign peoples.
The brutality the Jewish intelligentsia was liquidated with, after fulfilling the purpose of replacing the Czarist empire, seemed to underline this supposition. I had to assume that Stalin wanted to make sure in good time that these Jewish intellectuals did not also infect the Great Russian empire he envisioned, the Pan-Slavic goal, that, after all, is only the spiritual succession of Peter the Great.
Therefore, both sides, however, with full recognition of their irreconcilable oppositions, had to set the cornerstone of a lasting understanding: the embarrassingly exact delineation and consideration of spheres of interest and the restriction to mere economic cooperation that guaranteed each one their advantage. Therefore, it would have been an agreement within constant vigilance and with the finger on the trigger.
As far as foreign countries and our relationship to the political environment are concerned, it is quite impossible to formulate fixed theorems because the conditions change constantly. Twenty years ago I wrote that in Europe there are only two possible allies for Germany: England and Italy. Fate has prevented me from putting into practice politics that derive logically from this knowledge.
Although the English still possess the power of a world empire, they already lack the moral values necessary for the preservation of this empire.
Our attitude in the French colonies was not always gullible. Here, too, our great geniuses of the ‘Wilhelmstrasse’ [*Berlin-seat of Prussia and the German Reich] were in their element. Truly classic diplomats, old-school military and ‘East Elbe Krautjunker’ [*Prussian nobility and grand-land owners] were our helpers for a European-scale revolution. They were bogged down in the ideas of a warfare practiced in the last century. At no cost were we to play France’s game against the peoples who bore the French yoke. On the contrary, we had to help them with their liberation from this tutelage. We even had to incite them to do so, if necessary. Nothing prevented us from taking such action in 1940, neither in the Near East nor in North Africa.
Our diplomats, however, set their minds on consolidating the power of France in Syria, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Our self-important politicians preferred to cultivate social relations with elegant Frenchmen instead of reciprocating the friendship of the insurgents. They preferred to have breakfast with cane-wielding colonial officers who planned only deception and betrayal, rather than with the Arabs, who would have remained true allies to us.
Well, I’m familiar with the speculations of these professional swindlers. They understand their métier, and they have their role models! They thought only of playing a trick on the English, as for them still exists the long-vanished age of colonial opposition between France and England.
What I mean with this is that they live in the ‘Wilhelm Epoch,’ in the world of Queen Victoria, Fouche, Poincare and Delcasse! But this opposition exists now only on the surface and does not go deeper. There is much more appearance to it than reality, and only because there are also diplomats of the old school among our enemies.
If we are to be defeated in this war, then it can be only a total defeat for us. Our opponents have announced their goal loud enough to let us know that we don’t need to have any illusions about their intentions. World Jewry, the Bolsheviks, and the whole pack of drooling hyenas in their entourage, will certainly not abandon their weapons before they have destroyed, obliterated and fully splintered National Socialist Germany.
Inevitably, in such a war, where two worldviews of such opposition collide, an unfortunate outcome of battle will result in total defeat. It is a fight that needs to be fought on both sides to the point of complete exhaustion, and we know what to expect, namely that we will have to endure either until victory or to our last drop of blood. Any thought of defeat is unbearable. With horror do I think of an empire torn to pieces by the victors, of the suffering of a population surrendered to the debauchery of bestial Bolsheviks and American gangsters.
And yet, even this vision of horror can not rob me of the unwavering faith in the future of the German people. The more we will have to suffer, the more palpable will be the rise of the immortal Reich. The special ability of the German national character to go into political hibernation, always just then when a perseverance of national self-assertion threatens the continued existence of the nation, will come to be useful one day.
I, however, would not be able to breathe in such a transitional state of Germany as it would follow a defeated Third Reich. Whatever we have experienced in shame and betrayal in 1918 would be nothing compared to what we would have to face.
Incomprehensible that such a possibility could occur after 12 years of National Socialism! It is inconceivable that the German people, henceforth deprived of its elite who has led them to heroic greatness, would roll for years in muck. What moral laws, what guidelines will be there for those remaining unshakeably loyal to themselves?
Whatever happens, the Germans must never forget that it is always important for them to eradicate the elements of discord and work tirelessly for the unity of the empire.”
Translated from German into English by germanvictims.com